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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,
VS.

Case No. 20040955-CA

DEVON KINNE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority Level 2 - Incarcerated

APPELLANT'S BRIEF (AMENDED)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-2a-3(2)(e) and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provides this Court's

jurisdiction over this appeal from two Judgments and Orders of Commitment to Utah
State Prison entered October 18, 2004, in this case involving charges of Burglary, a
second degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony; Receiving or Transferring a Stolen
Motor vehicle, a second degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Issue 1;

Did the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction presented at trial
correctly state the law?

Standard of Review: Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is
review able under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the
trial court's ruling. State v. Reyes. 2004 UT App 8, f 14, 84 P.3d 841, citing State v.
Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993).

Determining the propriety of the

instructions submitted to the jury presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness. Id. at f 15, see, Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah App. 1993).
Issue 2;

Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective when she failed to move
for a directed verdict at the end of defendant's trial?

Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed
question of law and fact; however, where defendant is represented by new counsel on
appeal and the record is adequate to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the court will review these claims as a matter of law. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
518 (Utah 1994); State v. Chacon, 926 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
L

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDS. V, VI, and

n.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ART. I §§

XIV.

7,12.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 23, 2004, Devon Kinne (hereinafter "Kinne") was charged by
Information in Case No. 0417-14 in the Seventh Judicial District Court with Burglary, a
second degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony. Vol. I, pp. 1-21. On January
27, 2004, Kinne was charged separately by Information in Case No. 0417-12 in the
Seventh Judicial District Court with Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle,
Trailer or Semitrailer, a second degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor. Vol. II, pp. 1-2. In an order signed February 2, 2004, the trial
court appointed Joyce B. Smith to represent Kinne in these two matters. Vol. I, pp. 7-10;
1

The record on appeal contains two separate pleadings files on the separate charges in
this matter. Unfortunately, these were not paginated together, but both begin with page
1. To avoid confusion, Appellant will cite to the separate records as follows: for the
chargesfiledJanuary 23,2005, Appellant will designate the contents as "Vol. I" and for
the chargesfiledJanuary 27,2005, Appellant will designate the contents as "Vol. II."
2

Vol. II, pp. 3-6. Shortly thereafter, Rosalie Reilly, entered her substitution of counsel on
Kinne's behalf. Vol. I, pp. 12-13; Vol. H, pp. 8-9. On September 2,2004, Rosalie Reilly
filed her motion to withdraw from the matter, which was granted on September 3, 2004.
Vol. I, pp. 56-57, 65-66; Vol. H, pp. 45-46, 53-54. The trial court then re-appointed
Joyce Smith to represent Kinne. Id.
By agreement pripr to trial, the separate charges contained in Case No. 0417-14
and Case No. 0417-12 were consolidated for purposes of trial. Transcripts ("Tr.") at pp.
40, 148. On September 16, 2005, the consolidated cases came for jury trial before
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court. Tr. at p. 3. At the
conclusion of the trial, the juiy found Kinne guilty on all charges. Vol. I, pp. 109-110;
Vol. H, pp. 94-95.
On October 18, 2004, Kinne came before the trial court for sentencing. Vol. I,
pp. 133-134; Vol. II, pp. 117-118. Kinne was sentenced to one to fifteen years each on
the Burglary, Theft and Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or
Semitrailer, charges, and six months on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charge, all
to be served concurrently. Id. On October 18, 2004, the trial court entered two separate
Judgement and Order of Commitment (the "Judgements'9) for the separate cases.
Following trial, Counsel herein was appointed upon Ms. Smith's withdrawal to
represent Kinne for purposes of this appeal. On November 5, 2004, Kinne timely file his
Notice of Appeal from the Judgements. Vol. II, pp. 120-121. On May 3, 2005, Kinne
filed his Opening Brief with the this Court. In July of 2005, the State filed their Motion
to Stay the Briefing Schedule Pending Supplementation of the Record on Appeal,
indicating that the record on appeal did not contain the pleadings pertaining to the

Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or Semitrailer, and the
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charges. On August 8, 2005, Kinne filed his Motion to
Correct and Supplement the Record on Appeal andfor Leave to Amend Appellant's Brief.
On August 11, 2005, this Court granted Kinne's motion and set the amended brief to be
filed within twenty-one (21) days.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early December of 2003, Mr. David Wilson ("Wilson"), who was the caretaker
for Mr. Stephen Schultz's ("Schultz") residence, called and reported a burglary at the
Schultz residence. Tr. at p. 49. Deputy Mike Harris (hereinafter "Deputy Harris") with
the San Juan County Sheriffs Department was dispatched to the Schultz residence. Id.
Deputy Harris and Grayson Reid ("Reid"), the chief investigator for the San Juan County
Sheriff Department gathered evidence and took photographs of the ransacked residence.
Tr. at pp. 51, 52. Harris and Reid noted that the door frame and door edge were damaged
at the side entrance to the residence. Tr. at p. 52. Schultz identified several items that
had been taken from his residence, including a video camera, handgun, two shotguns,
two rifles, a stereo system, and two CD players. Tr. at p. 60.
On January 4,2004, San Juan County Sheriffs Department received a call from a
Julie Rogers (hereinafter "Rogers"), who is the mother of Kinne, indicating that her son
was at Julie Day's (hereinafter "Day") in LaSal with a vehicle that belonged to Rogers
and she wanted the vehicle returned. Tr. at p. 64. Deputy Hams lived close to the Day
residence and was dispatched to investigate the matter. Id. Deputy Harris did not find
Rogers' vehicle when he arrived but, instead, found a Jeep Wagoneer or a Jeep Cherokee

4

at the Day residence. Tr. at pp. 64-65. Deputy Harris ran a check through dispatch on
the Jeep and found that it was stolenfromthe Salt Lake area. Id.
Deputy Harris was then invited into the Day residence, where he observed Sarah
Lathrum, Cinda Lathram, and Day. Id. Deputy Harris knocked on a back bedroom door,
where another individual, Christopher Clark ("Clark"), was sleeping with the door
locked. Tr. at p. 66. Clark opened the door and Deputy Harris entered the bedroom and
asked Clark for identification.

Id.

While Clark was searching his pockets for

identification, he pulled out some marijuana. Id.

Deputy Harris asked Clark who the

vehicle belonged to and Clark told him that it was his mother's vehicle. Id. Deputy
Harris arrested Clark and took him to his patrol car. Id.
Before Deputy Harris re-entered the back bedroom of the residence, Day walked
out carrying a pistol hooked on her finger, informing Deputy Harris that it was in the
mattress of the bed where Clark was sleeping. Id. Deputy Harris9 further investigation
located a key on the floor that operated the stolen Jeep. Id. After discovering the key,
Deputy Harris again asked Clark who the vehicle belonged to and Clark informed him
that it was a friend's mother's vehicle and that he and Kinne had borrowed it to come and
see Kinne's mother. Tr. at p. 67.
Upon further investigation, Deputy Harris learned that the vehicle Rogers
reported missing had been towed to a wrecker's yard from roadside in the Salt Lake area.
Tr. at p. 68. Clark admitted to Deputy Harris upon questioning that there was marijuana
in the center console of the Jeep, which is were Deputy Harris located a black case of
some kind which contained the drug. Id. Clark admitted to ownership of the marijuana.
Tr. at p. 69. Upon further search of the Jeep, Deputy Harris found a set of scales, a

mirror, a syringe, and a bunch of little baggies. Tr. at p. 71. When questioned, Clark
indicated that those items were owned by Kinne. Id.
Several days later at the jail, Deputy Harris again asked Clark who the Jeep
belonged to and Clark again tells him that the Jeep belonged to a kid's mother. Tr. at p.
75. However, just prior to Clark's trial he reported to Deputy Harris that the vehicle that
belonged to Rogers had broken down and that he and Kinne found the Jeep running in the
driveway, so they jump in and drove to Monticello. Tr. at pp. 75 and 76. Deputy Harris
also asked Clark about the firearm that was found at the Day residence. Tr. at p. 76.
Clark told him that Kinne gave it to him to hold for him. Tr. at pp. 76-77. Kinne had
shown Chirk the gun and stereo and told Clark they were taken from the robbery in
LaSal. Tr. at p. 77. It is later determined that the serial numbers on the gun found in
Clark's possession and that stolenfromthe Schultz residence do not match. Tr. at p. 60.
On January 23, 2004, Kinne was charged by Information with Burglary, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202, a second degree felony, and Theft in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404, a second degree felony. Vol. I, pp. 1-2. On January 26,
2004, Kinne was charged by Information with Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor
Vehicle, Trailer, or Semi-Trailer in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §41-la-1316, a second
degree felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37a-5(l), a class B misdemeanor. Vol. II, pp. 1-2.
By agreement prior to trial, the separate charges contained in Case No. 0417-14
and Case No. 0417-12 were consolidated for purposes of trial. Transcripts ("Tr.") at pp.
40, 148. On September 16, 2005, the consolidated cases came for jury trial before
Honorable LyleR. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court. Tr. at p. 3. At the
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conclusion of the trial, the jury found Kinne guilty on all charges. Vol. I, pp. 109-110;
Vol. II, pp. 94-95.
On October 18, 2004, Kinne came before the trial court for sentencing. Vol. I,
pp. 133-134; Vol. II, pp. 117-118. Kinne was sentenced to one to fifteen years each on
the Burglary, Theft and Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or
Semitrailer, charges, and six months on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charge, all
to be served concurrently. Id. On October 18, 2004, the trial court entered two separate
Judgement and Order of Commitment (the "Judgements") for the separate cases. On
November 5, 2004, Kinne timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgements. Vol.
H, pp. 120-121.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court determined in a decision handed down on June 7, 2005,
that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction
carried with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33. f30. With such a
risk inherent in the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a juror may have
found Kinne guilty under a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt,
violating Kinne's due process rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.

Although not specifically objected to at trial, this Court

previously held that the "[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis
for reaching issues not properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled
interpretation of law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel.
T.M.. 2003 UT App. 191, f 16,73 P3d 959.

7

Under Utah law, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts
have consistently followed the United States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Thus, the defendant is required to show first that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that said
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment; and
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland at 687; State v.
Kellev. 1 P.3d 546 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521
(Utah 1994). More recently courts have simplified this analysis by providing that where
a motion for directed verdict would have been futile, there is no ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. O'Brien. WL22862190, 2003 UT App. 419, Utah App., Dec. 9, 2003;
State v. Whittle. 989 P.2d 52 (Utah 1999).
ARGUMENT
I. THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
FAILED TO ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397
U.S. 358, 362,90 S. Ct. 1068 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added), the United States
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it to both
the Fifth Amendmentrightto due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362, 364.
"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged." Winship. 397 U.S. at 364,90 S. Ct. at 1073,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

8

The Utah Supreme Court has recently overturned its holding in State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) setting forth a three-part test for determining
whether a reasonable doubt jury instruction was improper. State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,
f 1. The first part of Robertson required the instruction to indicate that the State must
"obviate all reasonable doubt." The original concept of this prong appeared"...to derive
from a fear that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant,
a juror might misapply the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard unless she is required to
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence." Reves at f 25.
The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and determined to abandon
it based on the fact that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a
reasonable doubt. Reyes at % 30. The Utah Supreme Court undertook the following
analysis:
Tf25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial
court erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at ^[19.
The "obviate all reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's
dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart,
J., dissenting). There, Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the
truth of the charge." Id. He reasoned that since the standard to be applied
is "beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any definition of the
standard must reference the obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by
the evidence, and must convey the principle that the State must surmount
the obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate
all reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a feat that in
ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a
juror might misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard unless she
is required to search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with
evidence.
f26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to
"obviate all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and
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conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront evidence in its
deliberations sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. The notion of
"obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or lacking in
credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction
concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and
useful concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence
overcomes them. A universal application of the notion that the State must
"obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the
concept of the presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an
array of inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain
a conviction, it follows that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt"
in every case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy view of the
presumption of innocence.
127 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard
is also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor
stamdard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking:
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt
against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation
of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason
for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its
burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit.
*8 f28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the
State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined,
the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the
Notre Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the
expanding prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated.
Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes
in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence. 78
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the
central vice of this trend this way: A troubling conclusion that arises from
the difficulties of the requirement of articulability is that it hinders the
juror who has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence
is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity implied in an obligation
to "give a reason," an obligation that appears focused on the details of the
arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which the rhetoric of
the law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state burden of
proof, require acquittal. Tic/at 1213.
129 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting
demands of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and
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fairly communicated through an affirmative description of the degree of
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see
little to be gained by including within a "beyond a reasonable doubf'
instruction the potentially confusing concept that every defendant is
entitled to a presumption of reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence
must obviate.
1(30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element
of Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we
expressly abandon it.
Reyes at H24-30.
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction expressly indicates
that "[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable doubt," which is substantively the same as
the prong in Robertson requiring the jury instruction to "obviate all reasonable doubt"
Vol. I, p. 118; Vol. II, p. 104. As indicated by the Utah Supreme Court, this instruction
carries with it the substantial risk that a juror found Kinne guilty based on a degree of
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. With such a risk inherent in the use of the
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a juror may have found Kinne guilty under a
standard less than that of beyond are reasonable doubt, violating Kinne's due process
rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction was not
preserved by trial counsel at the trial in this matter, this Court should review the matter
based upon exceptional circumstances.

This Court has previously held that the

"[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis for reaching issues not
properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. T.M. 2003 UT App 191,
116, 73 P.3d. 959. The original decision was handed down by this Court in State v.
Reves on January 15, 2004, upholding the three-part test in Robertson, and the prong
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requiring the use of the language "obviate all reasonable doubt." 2004 UT App 8, 84
P.3d 84. Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in that matter in May of 2004.
The trial in the instant matter was held September 16, 2004, while review of Reyes was
pending. The Opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reves. abandoning the
three-part test in Robertson was handed down on June 7,2005. It is clear that this change
in law, overturning an eight (8) year precedent in Robertson was clearly an unsettled
interpretation of the law that colored the ability of Kinne's trial counsel to raise the issue
surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction.
H. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN
SHE FAILED TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
Under Utah law, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts
have consistently followed the United States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Thus, the defendant is required to show first that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that said
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment; and
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland at 687; State v.
Kelley. 1 P.3d 546 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521
(Utah 1994). More recently courts have simplified this analysis by providing that where
a motion for directed verdict would have been futile, there is no ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. O'Brien, WL22862190, 2003 UT App. 419, Utah App., Dec. 9, 2003;
State v. Whittle. 989 P.2d 52 (Utah 1999).
Utah courts routinely consider motions to dismiss separate and distinct from
motions for directed verdict. As its name implies, a motion for a directed verdict under
Rule 50(a) contemplates only jury trials. See, Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711
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P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985). In the context of a bench trial, the directed verdict's
procedural counterpart is a motion for involuntary dismissal under UT. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
See, UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b), Bair v. Axiom Design. L.L.C.. 20 P.3d 388 (Utah 2001). The
standard for a directed verdict is that "the court must decide whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Wilkins v. Packerware Corp.. 2005
WL 1528670 (D.Kan.,2005).
In Howard Industries. Inc. v. U.S.. the court states that the judge determines only
the law in a jury trial, and conversely, the judge in a non-jury trial is the trier of the facts
and the law. 126 Ct.Cl. 283, 115 F.Supp. 481. Therefore, when a motion for directed
verdict is made by a defendant in a jury trial, the judge after considering all the evidence
must decide if the evidence makes a case on which the law can afford relief. Schad v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.. 136 F.2d 991. This question is solely one of law and
thefindingsof the jury involve no "appraisal of the weight or credibility of the evidence
nor any finding of basic or circumstantial facts. It is merely a formal finding, pursuant to
the trial judge's instruction, that upon the facts as the plaintiffs evidence shows them to
be and upon the applicable rules of law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." Id. In
Winegar v. Slim Olson. Inc.. the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "[w]hen the trial is
before a jury, the court cannot weigh the testimony upon a motion for a nonsuit, for the
reason that it cannot weigh it at any time." 122 Utah 487,252 P.2d 205 (Utah 1953).
Utah appellate courts have imposed separate standards for granting motions for
directed verdicts than for motions to dismiss. When determining whether a motion for
directed verdict should be granted, courts look to whether there is sufficient evidence to
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give the case to the jury. State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993V When
considering a motion to dismiss, the courts consider whether the state has proven all of
the necessary elements to make a. prima facie case. State v. Milne. 124 P.2d 540 (Utah
1942). The two motions cannot be substituted for one another based upon these differing
standards. This Court has previously indicated that it will only substitute a motion to
dismiss for a motion for directed verdict if the correct standard is applied in the parties'
argument and the trial court's determination of the matter. State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d
267,269 (Utah App. 1993).
A review of Utah case law reveals that many ineffective assistance of counsel
claims fail because the defendant cannot establish that counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced them. Utah courts have visited the issue of whether failure to move for
directed verdict constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Each time where the
appellate courts have held that failure to make a motion for directed verdict was not
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court have reason that their ruling is based on the
fact that the State had undeniably proven its case. However, Mr. Kinne's case is unique;
it was not obvious that the State had proven its case.
The State produced only two witnesses at trial, one of which was the investigating
officer who did not personally observe any of the alleged criminal activity. The other
witness, who was the more vital witness to the prosecution's case, was unbelievably
inconsistent and admittedly lied at several stages of Mr. Kinne's criminal proceedings.
Based on the State's case alone, it was highly likely that the court would have entered a
directed verdict in Mr. Kinne's favor had his attorney made a proper motion for it.
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The State's first witness was Deputy Harris of the San Juan County SherrifFs
office. In short, Deputy Harris testified that he investigated a burglary of a residence that
occurred in December of 2003 wherein a gun was stolen. Tr. 60. Deputy Harris testifies
that there were no fingerprints to tie Mr. Kinne to the burglary or theft of the gun;
however a similar looking gun was found in Clark's possession and Clark reported that it
belonged to Kinne. Tr.60. It is important to note, however, that the serial numbers on
the guns did not match. Id. Throughout the testimony, it is also established that the
stolen Jeep was found in Clark's possession in Monticello, Utah.
The Deputy testifies that Clark told him that the stolen car was his mother's, then
it was a friend's car, then it was a friend's mother's car. Mr. Clark admitted several days
later that he was in Salt Lake and said that "we stole a car," later indicating that he and
Kinne had allegedly stolen the car. Finally, at Kinne's trial Clark testified that it was
Kinne who stole the car.
Clark initially stated that he did not know who owned the gun found in his
possession. Tr. 76. Clark then stated that it probably belonged to the lady of house at
which he was living. Tr. 76. Deputy Harris then testified that Clark eventually told him
that "Devon [Kinne] had given him the gun to hold for him." Tr. 76, 77. Deputy Harris
then testified that Clark told him that he knew that the gun came from the burglarized
house in La Sal because Kinne had told him that he burglarized it and showed him the
gun and stereo. Tr. 77. However, later on in the trial, Clark testified that he was with
Kinne when he allegedly burglarize the home in La Sal and took the gun found in Clark's
possession, but that he just watched and did not participate2. Tr 111,112.
2

Incidentally, Mr. Clark changes this testimony as well, first stating that he waited in the
car, then that he waited standing outside the house. Tr. 112,115.
1*

hi short, the evidence shows a burglary, theft, and a stolen car occurring with no
physical evidence indicating that Kinne was involved other than the inconsistent
statements of Clark who, coincidentally, was found with all of the stolen property in his
possession. Clearly, Kinne's trial counsel had sufBcient cause to move the trial court for
a directed verdict. Judge Lyle Anderson himself indicated that it would be unlikely that
the State would prevail with the evidence they presented, when he expressly stated while
analyzing the jury instructions that " . . . a conviction . . . [was] a longer shot than I've
seen in a while." Tr. at p. 148. The prosecution itself even concurred with this
statement, saying "Me, too." Id. at p. 149.
At the end of the State's case, trial counsel for Kinne moved the court to dismiss
the counts against Mr. Kinne on the grounds that the State had not made & prima facie
case. Tr. at p. 141. Ms. Smith then went on to argue that the charges should be
dismissed because she " []didn't think they had shown evidence as far as the intent or the
purpose in any of these counts." Id. The parties and the trial court then undertook an
analysis of the evidence as it pertained to the elements of each of the four charges. Tr. at
pp. 141-143. Ms. Smith's entire argument in favor of the motion was as follows:
Well, I don't think that they have shown evidence as far as
the intent or the purpose in any of these counts. First of all,
on the burglary, that there was an intent before entering the
residence . . . Okay. And then on the theft with the - with
the purpose of depriving, there hasn't been any evidence
shown that - that the vehicle was not just being temporarily
borrowed, that - you know, that it wasn't being returned to
the owner . . . Okay on the receiving stolen vehicle, there
has to be the intent to procure the motor vehicle. I don't - 1
don't think they've shown that, but well, I think they've they have tried to put some evidence in on that. And then
on the paraphernalia on the - they haven't shown any intent
to use the paraphernalia.
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counsel's motion to dismiss sufficed

Unfiled Verdict, trial counsel's motion and argument in support ol ilu

motion was so deficient that it deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel and
prejudiced the defendant.
The State may have presented evidence on the elements of the crimes, but it never
established that it was Kinne that committed the elements of the alleged crimes. Given
the trial court's own verbalization of its belief respecting the evidence, there is a high
likelihood that the trial court would have entertained a motion for a directed verdict, thus
undermining the determination made by the jury in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Kinne respectfully requests that the Judgements be
reversed and this case be remanded for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 2005.

K. ANDREW FITZGERALD
Attorney for Devon Kinne
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on this
day of August, 2005, I sent by first-class
mail, postage-prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above Appellant's Brief
(Amended) to the following parties:
Ms. Joanne C. Slotnik
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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Addendum

A

Judgement and < frder of Commitment to Utah State
Prison, dated October i IS, 2004
(Burglary and Theft charges)

SEVhNTH DISTRICT COUR f

San Juan County
FILED

;
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'
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--*•<<*

^ T H E gjgvENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 COURT1
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
1
Plaintiff.

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

vs.
DEVON KINNE
DOB: 07/10/1983,

Case No 0417-12

Defendant.

OCmUKR IK, 2004
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERS*
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls
Defendant Attorney: K. Ai
!!./»' hcine the da> and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment in this case, and the
defendant being present m court and represented by . m .1 i ..HKI detendjiit having heretofore
het-n *1 judged guilty of the offense of:
'COUNT 1: BURGLARY, a Second Degic.

-

a Second Degree

Felony, and the defendant stating to the court that there is no legal reason why judgment should
not be pronounced, the court now pronounces the judgment and s< ..
* *

ihaiiht deituflaiii r ^ v r w ^ r N N F K> imprisoned in the LT AH STA '

term of ONE (1) to. FIFTEEN < TM M \ K > on each count, to be sen -„

> follows,
™*~~
- -*

is to be served conciurently with sentence being served in Case No iMI ' I I li i, muli rnl lit il
defendant receive credit for time served.
It is furthered ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the amount oi SX/LL J"
jointly and severally.
DATED this

'/fyf^X

day of October, 2004.

^Jiyle R. Anderson
District Court Judge

WW.44t-^-

.raig C.
San Juan Cotfnty Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY

\t

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ) »

da. »-•

u . - .•.•••

„.. ....

^..... ;-.;. uu,

or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND < >RIli K * sf
COMMITMENT to K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Attorney for the Defendant at 55 East 100 Soutli,
Moab, IJ'l 84532. Adult Probation Department at 1165 South Highway 191 Suite #3, Moab, IJT
84.V<>2; and to the Departrrn'M' "' < Vrrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020.

Addendum ~B~
Judgement an,
ommitment to Utah State
Prison, dated October 18, 200 I
(Receiving and Possession charges)

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
F,LED

OCT 1 8 2004
•fc-HKQF THE COURT

Br.
DEPUTY

%r

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL Uli,.. .K. x v. -/>< <-. I
™ 4.ND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF I TAB
STATE OF UTAH,
JLDGEMJWN f AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

Plaintiff,
vs.

DEVON KINNE
DOB: 07/10/1983,

Case No. 0417-14

Detendant.

HONORABLE L\ Lh R. ANDERSON
Hulls
'". Attorney

^ \ndrew Fitzgerald

T
defendant being present v v-ou'* .v~ • ;.-r

- '* uouncing judgment in this case, and the
V- counsel ,MH! delendiml 'Living lirirtmo":

bee. .^juagc:. ;..
COUNT 1: RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING STOLEN M( )TOR VIT1U 'I ,»• TRAIU
ShMI I'RAll.l.R <
, So ,mil Di^ur k-loin ,ind COUNT2: POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor, and the defendant stating to the court
no legal reason why judgment

now oronounces the

judgment and sentence of th<- a>\ ^ follows, te w it. that the delendani, iJFVON KlNNh, In:
imprisoned in the UTAH STA ' > .*.<.s, :

= p ' \

!

5)YEARSoxi

tf*

Count 1 and SIX (6) MONTHS in the San Juan Count} J.IJI O«M I-HM ' "„ hf M-rved
concurrently with pi ison viitnicv being served in Case No. 041742. It is ordered that defendant
receive credit for time servedDATED tin;-

i l.i,. iif i I. I nil i n

?004.

-1

L Anderson
district Court Judge

^h^I/^i^^

anty Allomt^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I HEREF^ CT,K I'lJ- Y that on the jb

day of October, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid,

or hand delivered a true and correct ropv of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF
COMMITMENT to K Andrew Fitzgerald, Att.-niey for the Defendant at 55 East 100 South,
Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation Department at I 16* South Highway 191 Sui'c >H, Moab, UT
84532; and to the Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper. !T T X40?l >

)

lj$Cb~

Clerk

